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Preface
This paper reports on an assessment of the uses and values
of the technique of the political-military exercise as conducted
since 1958 by the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. The
study was undertaken in late 1964 in conjunction with the most recent
series, comprising political-military exercises and experiments
on deterrence sponsored by Project Michelson of the U.S. Naval
Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California.
There has been continuing interest and activity at the Center
for International Studies in exploring the political-military
exercise technique since the first such game was held here seven
years ago. As a result of this experience my colleagues and I have
formed our own opinions about its various uses and values. Hence,
we welcomed the opportunity provided by the Naval Ordnance Test
Station systematically to collect and analyze the current views
and expert judgments of those individuals who have been exposed
as players to this particular technique and thereby contributed
to its development.
In any case where an evaluation of a technique is undertaken
by the same institution that developed and sponsored it there is,
of course, a risk that the investigators' biases will tend to
produce a report favorable to the sponsor's purposes. We trust
that such effects have been minimized in this particular case
by employing investigators whose personal and professional interests
are primarily in communications and survey research rather than in
the technique of gaming itself, much less in its specific uses
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for pedagogical or policy planning purposes, as it has been
employed here at the Center for International Studies. The best
indication that our personal biases may have had negligible effects
on this final report is that many of the findings proved either
unexpected in terns of our individual and collective expectations,
or substantially different from these. For example, it was quite
unexpectedly found that each of the major occupational groupings
of respondents rated gaming as affording its highest utility for
that grouping's own professional purposes; and when unfavorable
or derogatory assessments of gaming were made by the respondents,
these tended to be directed toward uses of gaming outside the
respondents' own professional fields.
This assessment of gaming at the Center is based on the res-
ponses to personal interviews and mail questionnaires sought from
all 148 previous game participants. The 82 individuals who responded
were found to be highly representative of this entire group in terms
of certain background characteristics, and thus we feel that it can
be asserted with reasonable justification that the responses
received and reported on are highly representative of the full
range and variety of responses one might have expected from all 148
participants.
To the extent that this report represents a highly concentrated
overview of the responses to the study, I share the authors' belief
that further refinements or elaborations of specific findings, as
well as additional insights into the methodological problems of
gaming, might well be achieved through supplementary analysis of
both the quantitative and qualitative data. These have, accor-
iv
dingly, been processed and stored to facilitate such a possible
future project.
The preliminary design and day-to-day supervision of the
project were assigned to Mr. Barton Whaley. The principal effort
in the detailed design and conduct of the survey, the analysis
of the data, and the draft of the report was that of Mr. Richard
E. Barringer.
The laborious administrative details entailed in a survey
such as this requiring contact with large numbers of persons were
performed efficiently by Miss Judith Tipton with the gracious
assistance of Mrs. Eileen Smith. The coding of the data and much
of the statistical analysis were done expertly by Mr. Paul A.
Barringer. Professor Donald L. M. Blackmer, the Center's Assis-
tant Director, and Mrs. Jean Clark, the Assistant Editor, were
most helpful in reviewing the report and offering editorial sugges-
tions.
I particularly wish to acknowledge our sincere appreciation
of the generous contribution of attention and time made by the
many busy government, military, academic, and private professional
persons who participated in the study. Their high level of interest
was indicated by the large proportion who offered themselves for a
personal interview. We were, unfortunately, not able to visit many
of these because of the close time schedule under which this sub-
sidiary project was conducted.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project
THE STUDY DESIGN
In the series of nine political-military exercises or "games"
conducted since 1958 by Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield and his associates
at the Center for International Studies, M.I.T., one hundred and forty-
*
eight individuals have served as senior participants. In the fall of
1964., shortly before the last of these exercises, a letter was sent
by Professor Bloomfield to all one hundred and thirty participants in
the first eight of these games, announcing the Center's intention to
review this program in terms of its impact upon the participants them-
selves and inviting their cooperation in this effort. Each participant
was asked to indicate his willingness to answer and return a mail
questionnaire, as well as his availability for a personal interview.
Replies to this letter were received from one hundred and six (81.5%)
individuals. Of these, one hundred and three (79.2%) expressed their
willingness to participate in the program, and ninety-three (71.5%)
indicated their availability for a personal interview.
Due to the tight schedule of the project, the geographic dispersion
of the respondents, and the high degree of their stated willingness to
subject themselves to mail questionnaires, it was decided that twenty-five
personal interviews, conducted both for substantive information and as a
pre-test for the mail questionnaire, would suffice for our purposes. Of
the one hundred and thirty participants in the first eight exercises,
fifty-six (43%) were found to be located presently in Washington;
forty-five (35%),in the Boston-Cambridge area; and ten (8%) in the
*
For a brief account of this particular non-computerized, multi-
team, role-playing type of gaming see Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton
Whaley, "The Political-Military Exercise- A Progress Report,"Orbis,
Vol. 8 (1965, forthcoming).
..
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Greater New York area. Thus, of the twenty-five personal interviews
completed, ten were conducted in Washington, eleven in the Boston-Cambridge
area, and four in New York. The persons chosen for personal interviews
were selected, within the constraints mentioned, for their diverse
professional viewpoints and their representativeness of the entire
M.I.T. "gaming population" in terms of their background characteristics
(discussed below), or for their known interest and experience in gaming
techniques.
Prior to each interview, its informality and the anonymity of
response were stressed. The interview questionnaire, consisting of
twenty open-ended and closed multiple-choice questions on the substantive
nature of the participant's gaming experience and his reactions to it,
was deliberately used as an informal "cuesheet" to provide the maximum
freedom of reminiscence and comment, while assuring that all the
experimenters' preconceived questions were answered.
Upon completion of the personal interviews, a mail questionnaire
was devised containing all of the questions asked of the personal inter-
viewees (with appropriate modifications in wording), plus several other
questions raised by the interviewees themselves or suggested by their
comments. Appended to this "long" mail questionnaire were thirteen
"rating questions" in which the respondent was asked to rate the technique
of political-military gaming for various proposed uses, in comparison
to other techniques with which he is familiar, lastly, a section on
"hypothesized international events", was included in which the
respondent was asked to indicate, from a list of possible choices,
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the more or most likely U.S. policy in such a situation and its
eventual outcome. The purpose and results of' these latter two sections
will be discussed later.
The "long" mail questionnaire, including all three parts mentioned,
was sent to all those game participants who had indicated their willingness
to respond and had not been personally interviewed, and to the additional
eighteen participants in the final political-military exercise in the
series, conducted subsequent to the issue of the invitational letter.
A "supplementary" questionnaire consisting of the "rating questions" and
the "hypothesized international events" sections was also mailed at this
time to all those who had been personally interviewed, as promised them
at the conclusion of the interview.
In all, eighty-two persons responded to the study prior to its
conclusion, constituting 55.4% of the entire population of game parti-
cipants. This includes fifty-seven participants who returned the "long"
mail questionnaire, twenty-three who were personally interviewed prior
to returning the "supplementary" questionnaire, and two interviewees who
did not return the supplement (of the two, one is pro-gaming, one is anti-).
Prior to the selection of the personal interviewees, an exhaustive
listing was made of all background characteristics in terms of which it
was expected there would be significant differentiation among the game
participants. Seven such sets of characteristics were selected,
including occupation, recency of gaming participation, team role played,
etc. These characteristics, together with the cross tabulations for
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the response to the study, are listed as the first seven categories in
Appendix I. The high degree to which the respondents proved represent-
ative of the entire group of game participants, in terms of these seven
variables, may be observed by comparing the percentage distributions
of the game population across these seven characteristics in Column 1
with those of the total responding population across the same seven
in Column 4 of this appendix. These cross-tabulations were subjected
to the chi-square test for significance, a statistical device for com-
paring observed frequencies of categorized data with theoretical or
expected frequencies, and expressing this comparison in terms of a
probability that any differences that exist between these frequencies
are due to chance or accident and are not significant. The probability
that the differences in percentage distributions are not significant
was found to be .962. Thus, the eighty-two respondents to the study
are believed to be highly representative of the entire gaming
population of 148; and their responses and the results of this study
to be highly significant (beyond the 4% level) in terms of that
population.
The questions asked of the respondents and the tabulation of
their responses are given in the remaining appendices.
Appendix II contains the questions asked in the personal interviews
and in the substantive portion of the "long" mail questionnaire, and the
quantified responses to these.
Appendix III contains the mean ratings attributed to political-
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military gaming for its proposed uses in the "rating questions" section
of the "long" and "supplementary" mail questionnaires. These ratings
were made by the respondents on the following standard seven-interval
scale:
valueless : : : : : : uniquely valuable
A score of 0 was attributed to "valueless"; 6, to "uniquely valuable";
and successive integral values between. The ratings are listed for the
total response, and for each of five occupational or "institutional"
groupings of the game participants, the differences among them being
significant.
Appendix IV contains the questions asked in the "hypothetical
international events" section of the "long" and "supplementary" mail
questionnaires, together with the responses to these. Each situation
or issue posed in this section was selected from one of the first eight
political-military exercises conducted at M.I.T. The alternative
answers listed were the actual alternatives considered in the relevant
game, including the one ultimately selected, established, or indicated.
The responses are grouped into the categories of those individuals
who participated in the relevant game, and all other respondents.
In the analysis of the responses to this study, the raw statistical
data was first examined and analyzed for significances and meaningful
correlations. The qualitative responses, constituting the greater
portion of the data, were then drawn upon extensively to give
substantive meaning and narrative illustration to the quantitative
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findings. In effect, then, it is the respondents themselves who are
speaking throughout, except where conclusions are explicitly drawn by
the authors. The more statistically-minded, and those seeking validation
of the inferences and conclusions, may avail themselves of the appendices.
It may be noted that, at the outset of this study, some appre-
hension was felt by the authors over the possibility of a pro-gaming
respondent bias resulting both from the fact that the game participants
had evinced an interest in gaming prior to their participation, and from
the possible "halo effect" of their frequently expressed feelings that
the M.I.T. games are an enjoyable social experience. However, the
respondents' qualitative responses and their remarks about the design
of the questionnaire itself indicate that, in general, they assumed a
highly critical and responsible posture in forming and expressing
their evaluations and opinions.
It is also to be noted that where the terms "game" or "gaming"
are used, they refer to the political-military exercise as practiced
at the Center for International Studies.
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THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Gaming as a Learning Experience
Good, bad, or indifferent as it may be in terms of one's own pro-
fessional interests, the fact is that the political-military game is a
most intense and vivid experience, seeminglyr for even the most sophisti-
cated of individuals; and therein lie the bases of both its controversiality
and its potential as a heuristic and pedagogical technique. Indeed,
almost two thirds (64.9%) of the respondents characterized their involve-
ment in the games as extreme or intense; and over three fourths (76%)
of those personally interviewed were able to recall at least the research
objective and specific crisis, if not the precise outcome, of the game
or games in which they had participated, even though the time lag since
the respondent's actual game participation had in some cases been up to
six years.
Any experience so intense and so vivid is bound to be a learning
experience of sorts; and any such experience not perceived as good is
apt to be perceived as "dangerous," to use the evaluation of one
respondent. Of the eighty-two respondents, 35.1% reported having
learned something about the process of contemporary international relations,
40.2% about the foreign policy planning process, 37.8% about crisis
management and decision-making in crises, 37.8% about the technique
of gaming itself, and 13.4% about each of these four areas of interest.
*
The most often heard "danger"of gaming-the likelihood of its
constraining the imagination and flexibility of a policy planner or
decision-maker in parallel real-life situations-is discussed in the
section on "Gaming for Research and Policy Planning Purposes."
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In allfifty-seven or 69.5% of the respondents reported having "learned"
from their gaming experience, indicating that the experience does indeed
tend to be a learning one, at least as perceived by its participants.
But what is learned? In general, the insights and lessons provided
by the gaming experience prove largely to be dependent upon the knowledge
and preoccupations brought by the participant to the experience. In
other words, what occurs under the stresses of gaming is not so much a
process of learning as it is one of sensitizing; not so much something
new that is learned as it is a reinforced and heightened awareness of
things previously known. By obliging the participant to confront a
problem in specifics rather than in generalizations, the gaming exper-
ience stretches one's consciousness and imagination, making more salient
things already known (though perhaps tucked away in some recess of the
mind) and facilitating the establishment of new relations among the
data bits. And because the experience is highly demanding in terms of
attention and concentration, as well as being of real interest, these
insights do not soon pass out of one's mind. Often, the respondents
indicate, these insights are salient enough to arouse new theoretical
and substantive interests. Of the personal interviewees, 40% (10)
indicated having given further consideration and attention to policy
problems raised in the games.
It has been suggested that maximum exploitation of gaming's
"sensitizing" function might be achieved by creating a scenario design
that is maximally at variance with present reality, thereby creating
an environment in which present policies and their assumptions are
obviously inadequate. Thus the professional game participant may be
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rid of his conventional notions and free to establish new insights
into a concise problem chosen by the Control Team. However, one of
the most frequent criticisms of gaming noted by the respondents (20.3%)
is the difficulty of grasping a scenario projection several years into
the future and embarking on a game with several critical new
assumptions amidst an essentially unchanged world. Such jumps are
uncomfortable; and, more importantly, no scenario can specify all the
assumptions that may be implicit in a radically changed reality. Thus,
the participant brings to any scenario his own assumptions about
contemporary reality, and tends to use them rather than bear the
discomfort and constraint of new, unfamiliar ones. The fewer such new
assumptions the participant is asked to make and the closer the scenario
sticks to present reality, then, the better can the problem under
consideration in the game be subjected to the total consideration of
the participants.
The problem of maximizing potential insights into any specific
subject emerges as one of effectively isolating and stressing the
subject within a matrix of familiar reality and assumptions for a
group of participants otherwise highly involved. Thus, both the
subject of the game and the relevant assumptions of the participants
are subjected to stress and to gaming's "sensitizing" function.
It is perhaps because so many respondents felt they had gained
fresh insights from gaming that the technique is seen as having potential
albeit limited value in several realms, if properly modified and
judiciously applied in terms of its relevant values. As mentioned
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earlier, the respondents were asked to rate the technique of gaming,
in comparison to other techniques familiar to them, for thirteen proposed
uses, six of which related to policy planning, four to research, and
three to teaching and training. As a whole, they rated gaming first as
a teaching and training technique; second, as an adjunct to policy
planning; and third, as a research tool for exploring international
relations and crisis management. More significantly, however, each
institutional grouping of respondents except one rated the political-
military gaming technique as being of maximum value within his own
professional ken and purview. The order in which gaming was ranked for
each of its three general areas of utility by the respondents as a
whole and by their institutional groupings is given below.
For Teachin
For Policy
For Researe
(Not
Rank Ordering of Gaming for its Three General Uses
TOTAL Academic Private State Def. Indep.
RESPONSE Dept. Dept. Agencies
g and Training 1 1 1 2 1 2
Planning 2 2 3 1 2 3
h 3 3 2 3 3 1
e: The "Independent Agencies" represented are ACDA, CIA,
and USIA. The actual mean ratings may be found in
Appendix III.)
These results tend to confirm our contention that what is learned
from gaming depends largely upon the knowledge and preoccupations one
brings to the experience. The deviance of the "Private" group from the
general finding may be explained by the fact that this grouping was less
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homogeneous in character than any of the others, subsuming individuals
with widely varied interests from diverse functional organizations and
groups. Among others, this category included a clergyman, a lawyer in
private practice, officials of private foundations, and members of
various private research corporations.
The results also indicate that the technique of gaming affords
differing values for different purposes, each demanding modifications,
adaptations, and refinements of the technique for maximum usefulness.
We shall now examine these.
Gaming for Research and Policy Planning Purposes
As developed and practiced at the Center for International Studies,
the technique of gaming most readily affords the values of isolating
a subject, concept, or assumption for intensive study and of subjecting
it to stresses of various kinds. By so doing, it has provided the
participants with often unanticipated and incisive insights into the
central problem posed and into peripheral matters, and has given them
dramatic illustrations of often crucial (though perhaps established)
theoretical and practical notions, thereby increasing the players'
conscious awareness of their relevance. On the other hand, the non-
reproducibility of the technique as presently practiced deprives it
of merit as a systematic device for testing and establishing the
general theoretical validity of these insights.
For research and policy planning purposes in general, the
respondents rated the value of the technique of gaming in the following
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descending order (mean ratings, out of a possible 6.0, are in parentheses):
1. for discovering unanticipated policy alternatives in international
problem situations (4.2);
2. for discovering unanticipated possible outcomes of the interaction
of conflicting strategies or specific crisis situations (4.1);
3. for generating new hypotheses about the nature of crisis manage-
ment or decision-making in crisis situations (4.0);
4. for increasing the precision and effectiveness of the foreign
policy planning process (3.8);
5. for evaluating the validity and viability of various existing
U.S. policies in international crisis situations (3.8);
6. for testing tentative hypotheses about the nature of crisis
management or decision-making in crisis situations (3.8);
T. for determining the likely effects of various possible U.S.
policies in crisis situations (3.7);
8. for generating new hypotheses about the structure and process
of contemporary international relations (3.6);
9. for testing tentative hypotheses about the structure and process
of contemporary international relations (3.4);
10. for determining the probable reactions of other actors to
various possible U.S. policy moves in specific crisis
situations (3.4).
What, then, is gaming perceived by its participants as being--
and not being?
First, as a research tool, it was regarded not so much as a tool
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for the investigation of the structure and process of international
relations as a technique for illuminating and investigating one aspect
of those relations: crisis management and decision-making in crisis
situations. Given the very structure of the political-military game
itself, this could hardly be otherwise. For, strikingly absent from
the game situation, by design, is the larger world context of real
international behavior; and always present are the intense personal
involvement of the participant and the heavy pressures to which he is
subjected. Beginning with the structured demand of the gaming technique
for decisions and actions within specified time limits, these pressures
build up in both the competitive intra-team exchange of assumptions
and proposals and in the inter-team competitive zeal to "win,'"
producing a fine laboratory for the illustration and study of crisis
management techniques. The competitive pressures at both levels tend
to create very real, though subjective sanctions. As one interviewee
observed:
You're looking at live people who are your peers coping
with genuine problems as they might arise, and doing so
under strong competitive and professional pressure to
perform well. It is often a real test of oneself as a
result.
And while no objective sanctions in terms of threats to the status or job
of the participants are applied, very few respondents indicated that
lack of such sanctions had in any way detracted from the real crisis
atmosphere of the game. This would suggest that, at least for interested
and sophisticated professionals, the absence of real sanctions does not
substantially affect the procedural aspects of the decision-making
process itself, although it may well affect the substantive nature
of these decisions (as, for example, by downgrading the role of weapons
technology in decisions or by increasing risk-taking behavior).
For research purposes, then, the small-group setting inherent in
gaming affords a singular opportunity for studying aspects of decision-
making and comunication processes in crisis situations. At the intra-
team level there is the opportunity to observe the processes of
situation-definition, information-search, risk-taking, group compromise,
and policy formulation. Simultaneously, at the inter-team level, there
are present such phenomena as bargaining, negotiation, and the communi-
cation of intent, commitment, and resolve.
However, the respondents regarded the technique more highly for
generating new hypotheses than for testing tentative ones, and they
indicated that a great deal more systematization and standardization
is required before it can become a systematic research tool. The role
of Control especially, the respondents indicated, would have to be
standardized, and many replays of the same problem run in order to
build up a sufficient number of cases for the kind of statistical
analysis that is associated with contemporary political science research.
At present the technique strikes them as too cumbersome, costly, and
non-reproducible for such systematic research purposes. Standardized
games, providing a standardized scenario and role for Control, played
by standardized groups of individuals, would seem a first step in
this direction.
Nonetheless, 41.3% (19) of those respondents who are specifically
engaged in research stated that their gaming experience had been of
practical value to them in doing their research. And while most felt
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that this experience had been of a "general and imponderable value,"
several respondents cited tangible practical effects of the experience
on their own research. Six (7.5%) of the respondents have used the
technique themselves for research purposes, and sixteen (20.3%) have
recommended its use for this purpose.
More than a research tool, the technique of gaming was regarded by
the game participants as a heuristic and testing tool for, or as an
adjunct to, policy planning. And it was regarded not as a technique for
predicting events, reactions, or the outcomes of conflict, or for evolving
actual contingency plans as such. Rather, it was valued as a technique
for generating evaluative insights into policy problems and, especially,
for discovering unanticipated possibilities in the international arena.
It is within this realm, if the sheer amount of substantive output by
our respondents is any indication, that gaming's greatest potential
and seemingly greatest danger both reside.
Of the study respondents, 43.9% (36) felt they had learned from
gaming something about the nature and requirements of the foreign policy
planning process; of those actually engaged in policy planning, 55.9%
(19) felt the experience had been of practical value to them in their
work; and 26.6% (21) of the respondents have had the opportunity to
recommend its use for policy planning purposes. What values did these
individuals feel gaming affords the policy planning process? These are
manifold and, while often overlapping the realm of "training" (which
is discussed in the next section), all highly pertinent to the complex
and difficult task of the policy planner.
When asked what elements of gaming struck him as being particularly
unrealistic, one respondent noted that in the real world only "rarely
can one focus on one item at a time." Indeed, the degree to which, in
games, the focus of all attention is concentrated on a single critical issue
or problem is typical of only the rarest international events. Yet herein
is the source of gaming's value to the policy planner: its capacity for
subjecting to stress a variety of variables, assumptions, policies,
techniques, and instruments, and controlling that stress in the interest
of testing the subject for its validity and implications. Accordingly,
in the words of one respondent:
The necessity under the pressure of gaming for resolving
the conflicting tendencies and action preferences within
one's own team forces the articulation of assumptions
behind these preferences. To the extent that the policy
planner is not aware of the assumptions being ground into
policy planning, gaming helps one guard against temperamental,
unconscious assumptions in dealing with problem situations
which can have many chance factors in them.
In so doing, gaming stretches the limits of one's imagination, of
one's notions of the plausible and the possible, and of one's awareness
of the roles of the unanticipated and the unexpected in international
affairs.
A second important effect of this experience for the policy
planner is the exposure it provides to crisis-type behavior and the
possibility that such exposure may help to minimize its effects in the
real-life instance. For many respondents the importance of communications
was surely dramatized, and its role in inducing crisis-type behavior
noted. As one personal interviewee noted, "in the light of this
experience, President Kennedy's reported emotional detachment during
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the thirty-eight divided council sessions at the time of the Cuban missile
crisis looms as a major prerequisite for a great diplomat or statesman."
In the same vein, the importance of communications between govern-
ments, and even of allowing communications in a hostile camp to go largely
un-jammed, were dramatically illustrated. Several other respondents,
reflecting upon the experience, cited a now more urgently felt need
for empirical study of the bases of reactions of people in other
societies, both by conventional research methods and by adding non-
Americans to gaming teams. One noted that while, in the games, "some
of the assumptions made about how and why people would react were
primitive, they were nonetheless made by more sophisticated individuals
than many of those making them in real life."
Another frequently mentioned value of the gaming experience for
the policy planner is that of having had the opportunity to work around
the periphery of a potential or incipient crisis once before, should
an analogous situation arise subsequently in real life. Thus it is
believed that the planner will acquire more of a "feel" for the timing,
logistics, political implications, and other aspects of the problem
than he would in the absence of the game experience. However, this
"familiarization" issue is also among the most common objections to
gaming among its detractors and especially among those who have not themselves
played in this type of game, being expressed in the terms that such a prior
game experience would constrict or inhibit the participant's imagination
and range of choice in the face of a real crisis situation which he
perceived as being analogous.
Several questions were designed to examine this most salient, even
poignant, issue. The respondents were asked how they felt a decision-
maker's prior participation in a political-military exercise might
generally tend to affect the quantity and quality of policy alternatives
perceived by him, should a real crisis situation arise similar to that
hypothesized in the game. While many noted that the answer to this
might well depend upon the personality and abilities of the individual
involved (suggesting that they were answering in terms of their own
experience and expectations), the results were:
Increase the Nunber 76.7% Enrich the Quality 8T.5%
Leave Unaffected 19.2 Leave Unaffected 8.3
Decrease the Number 4.1 Impoverish the Quality 4.2
As a check on this response, each respondent was also asked to
complete a section of fourteen "forced choice" questions on "hypothesized
international events," indicating the policy choice and outcome he
considered more or most likely in such an event (see Appendix IV).
The hypothesized situations were chosen directly from the final reports
of the first eight exercises in this series, and the alternative choices
posed represent the actual alternatives considered in the games. The
responses to these questions were tabulated separately for those who
had participated in the relevant game and for all other respondents.
The result of this tabulation is that in only one of the fourteen
questions was the difference in response between the game participants
and all others found to be significant beyond the 60.0% level. For
the set of fourteen questions, there was found to be no significance in
these differences beyond the 80.0% level. The differences in response,
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then, were not significant; and this set of questions would tend to
demonstrate the validity of the assertion that participation in a game
neither constricts nor inhibits one's range of choice in the face of a
similar crisis situation.
More than a mere "familiarization," then, the experience of gaming
is in general enriching to policy planners. And that the enrichment
provided by the game is not restricted simply to similar situations in
real life was indicated by the personal interviewees, 60% of whom
indicated that they felt their gaming experience to be applicable to
more general types of crises. The response of these individuals
indicated, in effect, that the gaming experience had provided them with
insights which might well be extrapolated to more general classes of
crises.
Generally speaking, then, gaming affords the policy planner the
manifold values anq effects of:
1. subjecting his assumptions, policies, and techniques to
controlled stress, thereby testing their validity, viability,
and implications;
2. exploring contingencies and alternatives not readily obvious
and which may emerge only too late in the development of a
real situation to be taken into account and compensated for;
3. illustrating the sequential unfolding of move and countermove
in a longer perspective than can be achieved in the nyopic
setting of day-to-day events;
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4. encouraging the flexibility of thought that comes of
challenging the "givens" of one's policies, and a corres-
pondingly greater flexibility in policy planning and operation;
5. emphasizing and delineating the human element in crisis
management.
The one warning note that must be sounded here is that we are not
tracing cause and effect in this study. We are merely reporting on what
the individual participants in these games, highly sophisticated individuals
by any normal standard, felt 4that they had derived from this experience.
However, as was noted earlier, gaming is primarily a "sensitizing"
device, illuminating, intensifying, and contrasting what is brought to
the game by the individual. Thus, the experience of gaming is only
as beneficial, or as dangerous, as the raw intellectual and attitudinal
materials brought to it. So long and insofar as policy planners may be
assumed to be sophisticated and flexible individuals, then, the problem
may be assumed to resolve itself.
Gaming for Teaching and Training Purposes
Although it was in both cases advocated as a supplementary and
synthesizing technique, political-military gaming received its highest
ratings as a technique for teaching and for training. In terms of
both, gaming is of obvious value as an interest-arousing and learning-
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by-doing technique; but it offers further distinct values in terms
of each.
As a training technique for professional senior-level military
and diplomatic officers, gaming was not regarded by the respondents as a
substitute for solid study of the traditional disciplines upon which each
profession is founded. It was, however, regarded by them as having
substantially unique value for:
1. forcing the individual to survey the landscape above and
beyond his own job;
2. affording the individual the stimulus to think in terms
of dynamic relations rather than in terms of discrete
objects of policy with respect to the behavior of both
the U.S. and other nations; and,
3. acquainting him with the complexities of crisis manage-
ment and decision-making in such situations.
Foremost among these values for the professional is the fact that
gaming underscores and vivifies the relationships among the diplomatic,
political, military, sociological, and economic factors involved in any
high level policy decision. In the gaming experience the individual
is afforded the opportunity to expose himself to these differing
functional viewpoints and to familiarize himself with the varying
assumptions, prejudices, and problems of the individuals representing
them. It was generally felt by the respondents that this common
experience among diverse functional types facilitates communication
among them in real life, and provides a convenient analogue in terms
of which the participant subsequently can and does perceive the larger
reality of policy problems.
The nature of these values, as well as the almost identical ratings
given gaming as a training aid by the participating State Department
and Defense Department personnel, indicate that the technique is of
essentially similar and equal value in these regards for the training
of both military and diplomatic personnel for policy positions.
It was further suggested by several respondents that gaming
might prove an extremely valuable "testing tool," to enable senior
professional personnel., acting as observers, to evaluate the potential
performance of trainees and candidates for policy positions. In view
of the extent to which the pressures of gaming throw light on the
personality of the individual., revealing many of his strengths and
weaknesses, it was believed that gaming would perhaps prove superior to
the traditional "oral" examinations in assessing an individual's
qualification for a given position. At the very least, it was
believed that gaming should prove a worthwhile addition to the usual
battery of assessment tests.
For the university student of international relations and foreign
policy, especially at the graduate level, gaming was likewise recommended
by the respondents as a supplement to the curriculum. The technique
has already demonstrated that it adds to routine course matter the
dimensions of both personal excitement and an appreciation of inter-
national rivalries as conflicts in basic assumptions, value dimensions,
and real interests. As one teacher reported:
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I've had my class act as the U.S., USSR, and Egyptian
teams in dealing with the projected deterioration of
Libyan stability subsequent to the present King's death.
Voluntary reading by the class clearly rose; emotional
and intellectual understanding and discrimination rose;
and all voted for making a game a regular feature of
the course.
Gaming was further cited for its value to students as an
aid in:
1. substantiating certain models and theories, as well as
specific theoretical views about (a) the role of uncertainty,
indeterminancy, and risk in international relations, and
(b) compromise, bargaining, and negotiation within and among
nations;
2. illustrating the complexities of diplomacy and of political-
military relations in international affairs; and
3. illustrating the problems and process of policy planning
and decision-making, with especial emphasis on the
constraints on the freedom of action in decision-making.
The technique of gaming was also likewise highly rated and recommended
as a supplementary technique for preparing university instructors and
professors for teaching international relations and foreign policy,
particularly as only a small proportion of teachers ever become
themselves actively involved in the planning and making of foreign
policy. In the words of one Ph.D. respondent, a former teacher turned
policy planner:
Gaming can give them a sense of responsibility in what
they're talking and writing about, by providing them
with a glimpse of what they might do if they were
participating in reality rather than just observing it.
Fully half of the thirty-two respondents who are engaged in
teaching or training felt that the gaming experience had helped them
in their work. Among all respondents, eleven (13.8%) have themselves
used the gaming techniques in teaching, and three (3.5%) in training
professionals. Twenty-three (29.1%) and twenty-two (27.8%) have had
occasion to recommend its use for teaching and training, respectively.
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SUNM4ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Viewed from the perspective of the reactions of the participants
to their experiences in the nine exercises conducted by the Center for
International Studies since 1958, political-military gaming emerges as
a diffuse learning experience of unique intensity and personal involve-
ment. In its capacity to exert controlled stresses upon various
isolated subjects and concepts, this particular technique generally
affords the individual participant the unanticipated and vivid insights
that arise from increased consciousness and awareness. Often, these
insights will form the bases of new and lasting interests and concerns,
testifying to the intensity of the live experience.
What is actually learned, however , is primarily a function of the
knowledgeability, preoccupations, and imagination of the individual
participant himself. Thus gaming provides many vivid illustrations
of and insights into any or all of the manifold aspects of international
political and military processes, depending upon the sensitivities of
the participant. The extent to which such is the case is reflected in
the fact that each of the major institutional grouping of respondents
rated gaming as being of principal value for its own primary purposes.
Thus, the academics rated it highest forteaching; the State Department
personnel, for policy planning purposes; the Defense Department personnel,
for training purposes; and the independent government agencies personnel,
for research purposes.
This also illustrates the fact that gaming affords differing
values for each of these purposes, necessitating tradeoffs and
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modifications within the gaming technique to adapt it most effectively
to its various heuristic, pedagogical, and testing purposes. Though
it is a general-purpose tool, gaming is not maximally effective for
all its possible purposes in the same structural format without at
least some alterations in format or presentation.
In general, the technique of gaming as presently employed is
regarded as having far greater value for generating insights and
hypotheses than it has for testing these. A great deal of study and
systematization of the nyrriad variables in the technique, especially
the insufficiently understood role of Control, is required before the
problems of its non-reproducibility can be resolved. A singularly
promising prospect of gaming for basic research, however, is provided
by its inherent structure as a laboratory for the study of snall-
group interaction and communication.
Within the policy planning realm, gaming's capacity for subjecting
systems, assumptions, and policies to controlled stresses, as maintained
by an alert Control Team., affords a unique testing and heuristic value.
It has been demonstrated that, for the policy planner, the experience of
so subjecting himself, his assumptions, his proposals, and his tech-
nologies is an enriching experience, pushing back the boundaries
of his imagination and preconceptions and leaving him a more flexible
and aware individual.
As a learning-by-doing device, gaming is most highly rated by the
participants as a supplementary technique both for training professional
military and diplomatic officers and for teaching students of international
relations. For the professional, gaming affords the especial value of
-27-
exposing him to functional viewpoints and responsibilities different from
his own, thus enlarging his understanding of policy problems and facil-
itating his communications across functional boundaries. It has also
been suggested that, given the revealing stresses to which the game
participant is subjected, gaming might well be employed as a supplementary
"testing tool" for the evaluation of candidates for policy positions.
For the student of international relations, gaming has been found
not only to arouse interest in substantive subject matter but to provide
vivid illustrations of certain selected theoretical notions and models
in that field. It has also been used effectively to demonstrate the
problems of policy planning and constraints on decision-making.
One negative comment frequently made by respondents on the use of
gaming for teaching and training is the disproportionate investment of
both time and money, compared with more traditional techniques, required
to conduct a game. Given the enthusiasm for gaming's value in these
regards, and the subsequent research values that might be afforded a
central evaluating agency in terms of systematizing the technique, it
would seem well worth the effort at this juncture to program a
standardized instructional gaming device that would allow game sponsors
flexibility in scenario construction and subject stress.
The many uses to which gaming is now being put attest to the breadth
of its applicability as a heuristic, pedagogical, and testing tool.
Among the current or recent uses to which it has been put are: in
communications research, to examine organizational decision-making; in
policy planning, to test and determine force structures, weapons systems,
and command and control communication systems; in the training of
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professionals, to illustrate escalation potential in conflict areas and
the local commander's role in combatting and containing such situations;
and in teaching students, to dramatize the roles of risk, uncertainty,
and indeterminancy in international relations.
Political-military gaming has thus proven its relevance and value
in several areas of contemporary practical and intellectual concern.
It would seem that the next task is to examine closely the variables
and factors of which it is composed and systematically to construct at
least a partially reproducible technique. In so doing, gaming's
present utility cannot be diminished; its applicability can only be
broadened further throughout the policy sciences.
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APPENDIX I
Participant Characteristics and Response
Note:
Col. 1 indicates the number and percentage of all participants
satisfying each of the specified characteristics.
Col. 2 indicates the number and percentage of all participants
personally interviewed, for each of the characteristics.
Col. 3 indicates the number and percentage of all participants
who responded to the mail questionnaire, for each of the characteristics.
Col. 4 indicates the number and percentage of all participants
who took part in the study (by interview and/or questionnaire), for
each of the characteristics.
Parentheses indicate percentages; all are additive vertically.
N for each individual column is as listed in the column heading
at the top of the page, unless otherwise indicated at the bottom of an
individual column.
1-2
2 3 4
No .Game No.Pers. No .Mail TOTAL
Part'pts Interv's Questn' RESP.
(N=148) (n=25) (n=!80) (N=82)
1.. Functional Classification
of Primary Occupation
Policy/Staff 53 4 26 27
(35.8) (16.0) (32-5) (32.9)
Research/Teaching 95 21 54 55
(64.2) (84.0) (67.5) (67.1)
2. Institutional Classification
of Occupation
Academic 48 12 29 30
(32.4) (48.0) (56.) (36.6)
Academic-student 9 0 4, 4
(6.1) 0.0) (5.0) (4.9)
Private 22 7 12 12
(14.9) (28.0) (.;5'0) (14.6)
Presidential Staff 1 0 0 0
(0.7) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
State Department 11 0 4 4
(7.4) (0.0) (5.0) (4.9)
State Policy Planning Staff 5 1 1 2
(3.4) (4.0) (1,3) (2.4)
State - US Mission to UN 2 0 0 0
(1.4) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Defense Dept. - Civilian 2 0 1 1
(1.4) (0.0) (1.3) (1.2)
Defense - Army 7 0 4 4
(4.7) (0.0) (5.0) (4.9)
Defense - Navy 20 0 13 13
(13.5) (0.0) (16.3) (15.,9)
Defense -Air Forc 9 2 6 6
(6.1) (8.0) (7.5) (7.3)
ACDA 6 0 1 1
(4.1) (0.0) (13) (1.2)
USIA 2 1 2 2
(1.4) (4.0) (2.5) (2.4)
CIA 4 2 3 3
(2.7) (8.0) (3.8) (3.7)
3. Number of Games Played
One Game
Two Games
Three Games
Four Games
Five Games
4. Game(s) Played
POLEX I
POLEX II
POLEX-DAIS I
POLEX-DAIS II
POLEX-DAIS III
POLEX-DAIS IV
DETEX I
DETEX II
DETEX III
5. Re-Invited to Play After
First Game ?
Not Applicable
Yes
No
1-3
1
No.Game
Part'pts
(N=148)
2
No.Pers.
Interv's
(n=25)
3
No .Mail
Questn'
(na8O)
4
TOTAL
RESP.
(N=82)
122
(82.4)
18
(12.2)
4
(2.7)
3
(2.0)
1
(0.7)
16
(8.6)
22
(11.8)
21
(11.2)
20
(10.7)
24
(12.8)
22
(11.8)
18
(9.6)
21
(11.2)
23
(12.3)
N = 187
18
(12.2)
36
(24.3)
94
(63.5)
14
(56.0)
7(28.0)
2
(8.0)
1
(4.0)
1
(4.0)
8
(18.6)
7(16.3)
5
(11.6)
3
(7.0)
2
(4.7)
7
(16.3)
3
(7.0)
6
(14.0)
2
(4.7)
n - 43
1
(4.0)
13
(52.0)
11
(44.0)
63
(78.7)
10
(12.5)
4
(5.0)
2
(2.5)
1
(1.3)
9
(8.3)
12
(11.1)
15
(13.9)
10
(9.3)
8
(7.4)
17
(15.7)
9(8.3)
13
(12.0)
15
(13.9)
n = 108
12
(15.0)
20
(25.0)
48
(60.0)
64
(78.0)
11
(13.4)
4
(4.9)
2
(2.4)
1
(1.2)
10
(9.0)
13
(11.7)
15
(13.5)
10
(9.0)
8
(7.2)
17
(15.3)
9(8.1)
14
(12.6)
15
(13-5)
N = 111
12
(14.7)
21
(25.6)
49
(59.7)
I-4
1 2 13 4
No.Game No.Pers. No.Mail TOTAL
Part'pts Interv's Questn' RESP.
(N-148) (n-25) (n-80) (N=82)
6. Basis of Invitation to Game(s)
Generalist 29 5 15 15
(19.6) (20.0) (18.8) (18.3)
Area Expert 60 10 32 34
(40.5) (40.0) (40.0) (41.5)
Weapon System Expert 59 10 33 33
(39.9) (40.0) (41.2) (40.2)
7. Team Role(s) Played in Game(s)
Control 45 7 24 24
(26.9) (219) (25.8) (25.3)
U.S. 47 12 30 30
(28.1) (37.5) (32.3) (31.6)
U.S.S.R. 29 6 18 19
(17.4) (18.8) (19.4) (20.0)
West Europe 1 0 1 1
(0.6) (0.0) (1.1) (1.1)
Great Britain 4 0 2 2
(2.4) (0.0) (2.2) (2.1)
West Germany 5 0 3 3
(3.0) (0.0) (3.2) (3.2)
Scandinavia 1 1 1 1
(0.6) (3.1) (1.1) (1.1)
Yugoslavia 1 0 1 1
(0.6) (0.0) (1.1) (1.1)
Middle East 3 2 1 2
(1.8) (3.3) (1.1) (2.1)
Israel 2 1 1 1
(1.2) (3.1) (1.1) (1.1)
U.A.R. 2 0 1 1
(1.2) (0.0) (1,1) (1,1)
Asia-Africa 1 1 1 1
(0.6) (3.1) (1.1) (1.1)
China 9 2 3 3
(5.4) (3.3) (3.2) (3.2)
Venezuela 3 0 3 3
(1.8) (0.0) (3.2) (3.2)
United Nations 14 0 3 3
(8.4) (0.0) (3.2) (3.2)
N - 167 n = 32 n a 93 N = 95
I-5
1
No .Game
Part'pts
(Nu148)
8. Willingness to Participate
in Study Indicated ?
Not Applicable*
Yes
No
No Response
103
(79.2)
3
(2-3)
24
(18.5)
N = 130
9. Availability for Interview
Indicated ?
Not Applicable*
Yes
No
Overseas
No Response
18
93
(71.5)
4
(3.1)
9(6.9)
24
(18.5)
1
(4.0)
24
(96.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
N = 130
10. Personal Interview ?
Yes
No
25
(16.9)
123
(83.1)
11. Mail Questionnaire Returned ?
None Sent
Yes
No
3 42
No .Pers.
Interv' 5
(n-25)
1
(4.0)
24
(96.0)
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
No.Mail
Questn'
(n=80)
12
(15.0)
66
(82.5)
0
(0.0)
2
(2.5)
TOTAL
1IESP.
(N-82)
12
(14.6)
68
(82.9)
0
(0.0)
2-
(2.5)
12
(15.0)
61
(76-3)
0
(0.0)
5
(6.2)
2
(2.5)
12
(14.6)
63
(76.8)
0
(0.0)
5
(6.1)
2
(2.5)
23
(28.8)
57
(71.2)
25
(30.5)
57(69.5)
23
(15.5)
80
(54.1)
45
(30.4)
0
,(0.0)
23
(92.0)
2
(8.0)
0
(0.0)
80
(97.5)
2
(2.5)
* The "Not Applicable" categories include those game participants who participated
only in the last exercise of the current series, DETEX III, which was conducted after
the invitational letters for this study were sent out to all past participants.
DETEX III participants are included in this study, however.
The chi-square test for significance was applied to the "total response"
distributions of characteristics 1-{, the basic participant characteristic
scheme designed prior to the administration of interviews and questionnaires
as an exhaustive isting of all regards in which it was believed there would
be significant differentiation among the participants. The chi-square value
and probability were found to be 3.94 and .962, respectively. Thus, the 82
respondents in the study are believed to be highly representative of the entire
gaming population of 148; and the responses and the results of this study, to
be highly significant statistically, beyond the 4% level.
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APPENDIX II
Responses to
Questions Pertaining to Participant's
Gaming Experience and Its Effects
Note:
Part A contains those questions asked only of personal interviewees.
Part B contains those questions asked in the long mail questionnaire,
including the remainder of the questions asked of the personal interviewees.
Closed, at the end of a question, indicates that the question was
posed as a "closed question," with a stipulated multiple choice response
format.
Open, at the end of a question, indicates that it was posed as an
"open-ended" question affording the respondent complete freedom of res-
ponse. The responses have been categorized and quantified as indicated.
N, the number of respondents, is indicated at the end of each
question.
Parentheses indicated percentages.
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PART A.
A-1. Do you recall any of the specifies of the (last) game in which you
participated? (closed; n = 25)
10 - Good Recall
(40.0)
9
(36.0)
6
(24.0)
- Fair Recall
- Poor Recall
A-2. Can you recall any particularly striking thing you learned from that
game about policy? (open; n = 25)
18
(72.0)
0
(0.0)
7
(28.0o)
- Yes
- Emphasized previous knowledge
- No
A-3. Have you given any further consideration to the policy problems
raised by this game? (open; n = 25)
10
(40.0)
15(60.0)
- Yes
- No
A-4. Can you specify any general type of crisis to which you feel this
particular gaming experience might well apply? (open; n = 25)
15 - Yes
(60.0)
10 - No
(40.0)
PART B.
B-1. In your own words, how would you characterize the degree of your own
personal involvement in the game(s) in which you have participated?
(closed; n w 77)
50 - Extreme, intense(64.9)
23 - Moderate, fair
(29.9)
4 - Low
(5.2)
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B-2. What elements or aspects of the game(s) would you say, account for
whatever degree of involvement you may have felt? (open; n = 76)
27 - A personal or professional interest
(35.5) in the specific problem gamed, or in the
game outcome.
22 - The quality or realism of the scenario design;
(28.9) and/or aspects of the management of the game
by Control.
18 - The assumption of and commitment to one's
(23.7) assigned role in the game.
21 - The competitive inter-team pressures of the
(27.6) problem as gamed.
20 - The demands and/or pressures of problem con-
(26.3) frontation and resolution at the intra-team
level.
17 - The calibre, contributions, and/or commitment
(22.4) of one's co-participants in the game.
11 - The conscious pleasure or "fun" of playing
(14-5) in a formalized "game," as such; and/or, of
being isolated from one's everyday concerns at
MIT's Endicott House.
13 - Other
B-3. Has it been your experience in gaming that there is generally a team
that "wins" the game, so to speak? (closed; n w 76)
27 - Yes
(35.5)
49 - No
(6405)
B-4. How about international politics in general? Would you characterize it
as essentially a "zero-sum" game, in which one side's gain generally
represents the other's loss? (closed; n = 76)
10 - Yes
(13.2)
66 - No
(86.8)
B-5. In carrying out the role(s) assigned you in the game(s) you have played, did
you find that you acted any more or less aggressively than you would nor-
mally have expected to? (closed; n u 79)
25 - More
(31.6)
10 - Less
(12.7)
44
(55.7)
- No more, no less
B-6. Again, did you find in the game situation that you were any more or less
willing to take risks than you would normally have expected to be?
(closed; n = 77)
25 - More
(32.5)
9
43
(55.8)
- Less
- No more, no less
B-7a. (no corresponding question on Personal Interview)
Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel you
have learned from your gaming experience about the process of contemporary
international relations? (open; n = 57)
20 - Yes
(35.1)
(1.8)
24
(42.1)
12
(21.0)
- Emphasis of previous knowledge
- No
- No Response
B-7b. Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel
you have learned from your gaming experience about the nature and re-
quirements of the foreign policy planning process? (open; n a 82)
33
(40.2)
3
(367)
31
(37.8)
15
(1863)
- Yes
- Emphasis of previous knowledge
- No
- No Response
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B-7c. Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel
you have learned from your gaming experience about the problems of crisis
management and decision-making in crisis situations? (open; n = 82)
31
(37.8)
5(6.1)
31
(37.8)
- Yes
- Emphasis of previous knowledge
- No
15 - No Response
(1843)
B-7d. Can you cite any particularly striking thing or things which you feel
you have learned from your gaming experience about the technique of
gaming itself? (open; n = 82)
31
(37.8)
1
(1.2)
38
(4603)
- Yes - positive or neutral affect
- Yes - negative affect
- No
12 - No Response
(147)
B-8a. How do you feel a decision-maker's prior participation in a political-
military game might generally tend to affect the number of policy
alternatives perceived by him, should there arise a real crisis situa-
tion similar to that hypothesized in the game? (closed; n = 73)
56(76-7)
14
(19.2)
3
(41)
- Increase
Leave unaffected
Decrease
B-8b. (no corresponding question on Personal Interview)
How do you feel a decision-maker's prior participation in a political-
military game might generally tend to affect the quality of policy
alternatives perceived by him, should there arise a real crisis situa-
tion similar to -that hypothesized in the game? (closed; n = 48)
42 - Enrich
(87-5)
4
(8-3)
2 )
(4.2)
- Leave unaffected
- Impoverish
B-9. What would you say were the major elements of unreality of the game(s)
in which you have participated? (open; n = 74)
15 - The assumptions and/or projections of the game
(20.3) scenario, as imposed on the players.
38 - The efforts, actions, and/or techniques of Control
(51.4) in guiding the game's development, including its inter-
nal time resolution.
12 - The selection of participant personnel by the game
(16.2) sponsors; and/or the artificiality or inappropriate-
ness of role assignments.
19 - The blurring or simplification of the real world
(257) complex, or the absence of the "large picture"
of reality.
14 - Aspects of the communications process between
(18.9) teams (i.e., nations).
8 - Aspects of game intelligence procedures.
(10.8)
17 - Aspects of the decision-making process or problem
(23.0) resolution in crisis situation.
10 - Other
(13.5)
B-10. Again, what would you say were the particularly realistic elements of
the game(s) in which you have participated? (open; n = 62)
4 - The selection of personnel by the game sponsors; and/
(6.5) or their role assignments.
16 - The initial game scenario situation.
(25.8)
8 - Aspects of the actions of Control in guiding the
(12.9) game's development, including its internal time
resolution.
6 - The emotional involvement by the individual parti-
(9.7) cipants in the game crisis problem, and/or the emo-
tional identification of teams with their real-life
counterparts in the face of such a problem.
14 - Aspects of the communications process between teams,
(22.6) and/or of intelligence procedures.
18 - Aspects of the decision-making process or problem
(29.0) resolution in crisis situations.
II-7
20
(3203)
2
(302)
- Aspects of the interplay of "live" strategies
in the international arena, including the limits
of influence appertaining in foreign policy, and the
formulated policies of the nations involved.
- Other
B-l1a. If you are, or have been engaged in research activities, can you
cite any instances in which your gaming experience has been of practical
value to you in this field? (open; n = 46)
19
(4103)
- Yes
27 - No(58.7)
B-llb. (no corresponding question on Personal Interview)
If you are, or have been engaged in teaching or training activities,
can you cite any instances in which your gaming experience has been of
practical value to you in these fields? (open; n = 32)
16
(5000)
16
(50.0)
- Yes
- No
B-12. If you are, or have been engaged in policy planning, formulation, or
implementation, can you cite any instances in which your gaming experience
has been of practical value to you in these activities? (open; n - 34)
19 - Yes
(55.9)
15
(44.1)
- No
B-13. Have you personally ever conducted or sponsored any political-military
games of the MIT type? (closed; n = 80)
11
(13.8)
3
(3.5)
6
(7.5)
4
(5.0)
0
(0.0)
60
(7500)
- Yes, for teaching
- Yes, for training
- Yes, for research
- Yes, for policy planning
- Yes, for other purposes
- No
11-8
B-14. Have you
played a
ever recommended the use of political-military gaming, or
part in stimulating its use? (closed; n 79)
23 - Yes, for teaching
(29.1)
22 - Yes, for training
(27.8)
16 - Yes, for research
(20.3)
21 - Yes, for policy planning
(26.6)
3 - Yes, for other purposes
(3.8)
26 - No
(32-9)
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APPENDIX III
Mean Ratings of the Technique of Political-
Military Gaming for Various Proposed Uses
Note:
Col. 1 indicates aggregate mean rating by all respondents.
Cols. 2-6 indicate mean ratings by institutional groupings,
based on the professional occupation of the respondent at the time
of his (most recent) game participation.
PART A includes the ratings for each specific proposed use of
gaming.
PART B includes the ratings for the cumulative sets of ques-
tions dealing with the proposed uses of gaming for (1) policy
planning, (2) research, and (3) training.
All mean ratings indicated are out of the maximum possible
score of six (6).
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1 2 3 4 5 6
A. Compared with other tEch-
niques with which you are
familiar, how would you
rate political-military
gaming of the MIT type as:
Aca-
AGG demic
X R
Pri-
vate
State
Dept.
xR
Def.
Dept.
xR
Indep.
Agencies
x
a technique for increasing the
precision and effectiveness of
the foreign policy 'planning
process? 3.8 3.5 3.3 4.5 4.1 4.0
2) a technique for evaluating
the validity and viability of
various existing U.S. policies
in international crisis situa-
tions.
3) a technique for discovering
unanticipated U.S. policy alter-
natives in present or possible
international problem situations?
3.8 3.6 3.3 4-3 4.2 4.0
4.2 3.8 3.6 4.0 4.9 4.8
a technique for determining the
likely effects of various possi-
ble U.S. policies in crisis
situations? 3.7 3.6 2.7 4.5 4.0 4.2
5) a technique for determining the
probable reactions of other actors
on the international stage to var-
ious possible U.S. policy moves
in specific crisis situations?
6) a technique for discovering un-
anticipated possible outcomes of
the interaction of conflicting
strategies in specific crisis
situations?
7) a technique for testing tenta-
tive hypotheses about the struc-
ture and process of contemporary
international relations?
8) a technique for testing tenta-
tive hypotheses about the nature
of crisis management or decision-
making in crisis situations?
consists of ACDA, CIA, USIA
3.4 3.4 2.4 4.3 3.6 3.3
4.1 4.0 3.5 4.7 4.5 4.2
3.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.3
3.8 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0
1)
4)
111-3
1 2 3
Aca-
AGG demic
X R
Pri-
vate
K
4 5 6
State
Dept.
R
Def.
Dept.
R
Indep.
Agencies
K
9) a technique for generating new
hypotheses. about the structure
and process of contemporary inter-
national relations?
10)a technique for generating new
hypotheses about the nature of
crisis management or decision-
making in crisis situations?
ll)a technique for training diplo-
matic and military officers for
policy positions?
12)a technique for preparing uni-
versity instructors and pro-
fessors for teaching interna-
tional relations and foreign
policy
13)a technique for teaching uni-
versity students of interna-
tional relations and foreign
policy
3.6 3.6 3.3 3.0 3.8 4.2
4.0 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.5
4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.5
4.o 4.o 4.3 3.7 4.0 4.0
4.3 4.3 4.0 3.3 4.4 4.2
N=80 n-33 n=12 n=5 n=24 n=6
B. Cumulative Ratings
FOR POLICY PANNING (Q. 1-6)
FOR RESEARCH (Q. 7-10)
3.8 3.7 3.1 4.4 4.21 4.1
3.7 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.3
FOR TEACHING AND TRAINING(Q.ll-13) 4.2 4.2 4.2 '3.8 4.23 4.2
IV-1
APPENDIX IV
Responses to Questions About
Hypothesized International Events
Note:
Col. 1 indicates the total response for each answer to the ques-
tions, and their percentage distributions.
Col. 2 indicates the number and percentage distribution of responses
by those respondents who participated in that game in which this event,
outcome, or conclusion occurred.
Col. 3 indicates the number and percentage distribution of res-
ponses by all other respondents.
Parentheses indicate percentages. All are additive vertically.
* (asterisk) indicates the event, outcome, or conclusion which
actually occurred in that game.
X2and P, in columns 4 and 5, indicate the chi-square significance
test value and probability. P indicates the probability that differences
in responses (between specific game participants and non-participants)
are due to chance, are not significant. Thus, the probability that
the differences are significant is 1-P.
For the entire set of 14 questions, X2  21.02
P 81.2
IV-2
1 2
Total Game
Resp. Part.
1) a. In the event of the death of
Poland's Gomulka and a subsequent armed
struggle for power between liberal-na
tionalist and the Stalinist wings of the
Polish Communist Party, would there be
likely to materialize a direct clash
tween Soviet and U.S. power?
be-
Yes
No
b. During such a dispute, U.S.
policy
would be designed to draw Poland
out of the Soviet bloc.
*would not be designed to draw
Poland out of the Soviet bloc.
5 0
(7.4) (0.0)
63 6
(92.6) (100)
N=68 n=6
5
(8.1)
57
(91.9)
n=6 2 0.0
29 2 27
(43.9) (40.0) (44.3)
37 3
(56.1) (60.0)
34
(55.7)
N=66 n=5
2) a. In the event of an armed
revolt in Iran and the outbreak of
widespread civil war against the Shah's
regime, is direct military interven-
tion by the forces of both the United
States and the Soviet Union likely to
eventuate?
*Yes 12 0
(17.6) (0.0);
No 56 8
(82.4) (100)
n=61 0.0
12
(20.0)
48
(80.0)
b. In the case of such an
event, official U.S. policy would
be:
in support of the Shah's regime.
in support of the rebels.
N=68 n=8
37 5
(64.9) (83.3)
0 0
(0.0) (0.0)
n=6 0 1.25
32
(62.7)
0
(0.0)
43
Other
5.
Px
2
1.00
1.00
.75
IV-3
1 2
Total Game
Resp. Part.
in support of negotiation be-
tween the factions for a coali-
tion government.
none of the above.
15
(26.3)
5
(8.8)
1 14
(16.7) (27,5)
0 5
(0.0) (9.8)
N=57 n-6
3) a. In the event of an indirect
and successful campaign of aggress-
ion and subversion against a deteriora-
ting Burmese government by the Commun-
ist Chinese, and the subsequent inter-
vention of a U.N. military force, would
you consider a temporary Sino-Soviet
rapprochement a likely eventuality?
22 6
(32.4) (42.9)
46 8
(67.6) (57.1)
b. Prior to United Nations
intervention in such a matter, the
U.S. government would have:
assumed a "hands off policy.
intervened unilaterally.
supported U.N. intervention.
intervened unilaterally while
awaiting UN action.
done none of the above.
N=68 n=14 n=54 0.64 0.89
2 0 2
(3.2) (0.0) (3.9)
1 0 1
(1.6) (0.0) (2.0)
47 9 38
(75.8) (81.8) (74.5)
11 2 9
(17.7) (18.2) (17.6)
1 0 1
(1.6) (0.0) (2.0)
N=62 n-ll n=51 0.0
43
Other
5
Px2
n=51 0.86 0.99
*Yes
No
16
(29.6)
38
(70.4)
1.00
iv-4
1 2 3 4 5
Total Game 2
Resp. Part. Other X P
4) a. In the event of an outbreak of
open and widespread civil war between
the Portuguese settlers and the native
nationalists of Angola, would there be
likely to ensue an explosive chain reac-
tion of colonial, racist, and ideological
elements throughout all of Black Africa?
*Yes 42 8 34
(60.0) (lo) (54.8)
No 28 0 28
(40.0) (0.0) (45.2)
N=70 n=8 n=62 5.41 0.15
b. In the case of such an event,
the U.S. government would, at least
verbally, support:
the Portuguese settlers. 5 0 5
(7.4) (0.0) (8-1)
the native Angolan nationalists. 19 3 16
(27.9) (50.0) (25.8)
neither of the warring factions. 44 3 41
(64.7) (50.0) (66.1)
N=68 n=6  n=62 1.46 0.92
5) a. In the event of renewed open
hostilities between Israel and the
United Arab Republic, and the failure
of the Soviet Union to lend the UAR
the support it sought, would the UAR
be likely to seek such support from the
Communist Chinese?
Yes 57 7 50
(83.8) (100) (81.7)
No 11 0 11
(16.2) (o.0) (18-3)
n-61 1.28 0.73N-68 n-7
IV-5
1 2
Total Game
Resp. Part.
b. In the case of such an event,
the U.S. government would:
take unilateral action on behalf'
of Israel.
seek to resolve the dispute
through the United Nations.
*
take unilateral action on
Israel's behalf while seeking a
resolution under UN auspices.
do none of the above.
1 0 1
(1.6) (0.0) (1.8)
37 2 35
(58.7) (28.6) (62.5)
18
(28.6)
7
(11.1)
5 13
(71.4) (23.2)
0
(0.0)
7(12.5)
N=63
6) a. In the event of an invasion of
South Vietnam by North Vietnam, a
successful counterattack by the South,
and subsequent Communist Chinese inter-
vention in the conflict, is it likely
that the United States and Communist
China would become involved in a major
military confrontation in Vietnam?
*Yes 63
(88.
No 8
(11.
N-71
n=7
7
7) (87-5)
1
3) (12.5)
n-8
n=56 7.35 0.40
56(88.9)
7
(11.1)
n=63 0.0 1.00
b. In the case of such an
event, the U.S. government would:
take no direct military action to
counter the Chinese intervention.
0
(0.0)
use tactical nuclear weapons again- 8
st the intervening Chinese troops. (11.8)
*counter the Chinese intervention
with conventional arms only.
58
(85.3)
43
Other
5
Px
2
0
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
8
(0.0)
0
(0.0)
8
(13.3)
50
(83.5)
iv-6
1 2 3 4 5
Total Game 2
Resp. Part. Other X P
do ncne of the above. 2 0 2
(2.9) (0.0) (3.3)
N-70 n-80 n-62 1,31 0.99
7) In a world in the advanced stages
of a general and complete disarmament
process, would you conceive it as nec-
essary that the -proposed United Nations
International Military Force have a
nuclear capability (under suitable con-
trols) if it is to do its various jobs?
*Yes 30 4 26
(44.8) (28.6) (49.1)
No 37 10 27
(55.2) (71.4) (50-9)
N=67 n=14 n-53 1.46 0.70
8) In times of international crisis,
which of the following characteristics
of command and control communications
systems would you consider to be more
important to the Presidential decision-
maker?
Security of communications to and 12 2 10
from control points. (19.7) (20.0) (19.6)
Rapidity of communications to and 49 8 41
from control points. (80.3) (80.0) (80.4)
n-10 n=51 0.0 1.00N-61
